Army as Police? Correlates of Public Confidence in the Police, Justice System, and the Military: Mexico in Comparative Context[1]

John Bailey, Pablo Parás, and Dinorah Vargas

Abstract

Typical responses to the perceived escalation of violent crime throughout most of Latin America are to increase the size and powers of the regular police and—in most cases—to expand the involvement by the armed forces to confront both common and organized crime. Participation by the armed forces in domestic policing, in turn, has sparked debates in several countries about the serious risks incurred, especially with respect to human rights violations. In Mexico the debate is sharpened by the extensive violence linked to conflicts among drug-trafficking organizations and between these and the government's security forces, in which the Army and Navy have played leading roles. Using World Values Survey and Americas Barometer data, we examine trends in public confidence in the police, justice system, and armed forces in Mexico over 1990-2010.

Using Vanderbilt University's 2010 LAPOP survey we compare levels of trust in various social, political, and government actors, locating Mexico in the broader Latin America context. That survey also poses questions about the appropriateness of the military acting as domestic police in fighting crime. Here we ask: Is public support for using the military as police widespread and generalized across the sample? Or are there patterns of support and opposition with respect to public opinion?

Our main findings are that: (1) the armed forces rank at the top with regard to trust, and—while trust in other Mexican institutions tended to decline in 2008-2010--trust in the military increased slightly; (2) respondents indicate that the military respects human rights more than the average and substantially more than the police or government generally; (3) public support for the military in fighting crime is strong and distributed evenly across the ideological spectrum and across socio-demographic groups; and (4) patterns of support emerge more clearly with respect to perceptions, attitudes, and performance judgments.

By way of conclusion we consider some of the political and policy implications of our findings.

Introduction

---

[1] Prepared for presentation at the seminar, "Desafíos de la Política Mexicana: Visiones desde el Barómetro de las Américas," held at CIDE, Mexico, D.F., January 28, 2011. This is a preliminary draft not to be cited or quoted without permission of the authors.

Based on findings from the LAPOP and Latinobarómetro surveys conducted between 2003 and 2008, "Citizens view crime as one of the most important problems in contemporary Latin America" (Mainwaring et al. 2010, 31). Although there are gaps between reality and perceptions, citizen fears have some basis in fact. Using homicide as a proxy for violent crime, Mainwaring et al. (2010, 32) report that homicide rates increased from the 1990s into the 2000s in fourteen of the nineteen countries examined. Further, concerns about crime have continued to rise. The 2010 Latinobarómetro reports that "Desde el año 2004 aumenta sin interrupción la percepción de la delincuencia como problema principal de la región de 9% a 27% en el 2010, el punto más alto que ha tenido desde que empezáramos a medir" (Corporación Lationbarómetro 2010, 12). As shown in Figure 1, respondents put crime above unemployment (27 and 19 percent respectively) as the region's principal problem.

PROBLEMAS MÁS IMPORTANTES: DELINCUENCIA Y DESEMPLEO.
TOTAL AMÉRICA LATINA 1995-2010 – TOTALES POR PAÍS 2010 PARA DELINCUENCIA Y DESEMPLEO

P. En su opinión ¿Cuál considera Ud. que es el problema más importante en el país? *Aquí solo 'Desempleo' y Delincuencia.

Fuente: Latinobarómetro 1995-2010.

Basambrío (2010) summarizes the varieties of responses throughout the region to the perception of rising crime, both outside the law (e.g., lynching, "social cleansing") and within the law, essentially policies of "mano dura." Legal responses typically include expanding police forces and improving their training and equipment, hardening criminal penalties, targeting youth gangs, reducing the minimum ages for legal culpability, and increasing prison populations. Also, a frequent response throughout the region is to increase the involvement of the armed forces, principally the army, in domestic policing.

Heavier reliance on the armed forces in policing, in turn, generates controversy about the potential for greater human rights abuses. To oversimplify, this is because soldiers are recruited, trained, and equipped to employ violence to defeat an enemy.

Typically military personnel are garrisoned apart from civilian populations and develop a subculture of hierarchy, discipline, and obedience. Policing, in contrast, involves close contact with the public, the ability to manage disputes with minimum violence, and strict adherence to civil rights and legal processes. Military personnel usually are poorly trained to properly conduct searches, apprehend and question suspects, operate highway check points, and gather the sorts of evidence needed for legal prosecutions. Too often, soldiers use too much force and pay too little attention to human rights and legal procedures. The overall result is a dilemma: the challenge of insecurity appears to overwhelm the civilian police, but involvement of the military creates serious risks to human rights (Dammert and Bailey 2007; Withers 2010).

In this context Mexico shows a quite distinctive profile, one which aggravates the dilemma about the use of the military in policing. Mexico is one of only five countries in the region whose homicide rate declined from the 1990s into the early 2000s: from 16.7 per 100,000 in 1991 to 11.3 in 2003 (Mainwaring et al. 2010, 32). In the early 2000s, however, the country experienced increasingly violent conflicts among criminal gangs, especially drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs), and between these and the government's security forces. The pace and intensity of the inter-gang violence increased dramatically during President Felipe Calderón's administration (December 2006- December 2012). There is considerable controversy about how much of the violence is a result of President Calderon's decision to rely more heavily on the armed forces in the fight against DTOs, or whether the violence results from increased inter-gang warfare. Whatever the mix of causes, ----, a leading national newspaper, estimates that 24,104

4

persons were killed in gang-related violence in 2007-2010 (==get cite==). These trends have ignited a heated national debate about the appropriate policy to promote public security.

Inevitably, violence on this scale will have a substantial negative impact on Mexico's overall homicide rate. Using the data on intentional homicides (homicidios dolosos) provided by INEGI, Escalante Gonzalbo (2011) reports a dramatic turnaround in the homicide rate at the national level: "El movimiento de los últimos dos años, 2008 y 2009, es absolutamente improbable: rompe con una tendencia sostenida de 20 años, pero rompe con ella además de un modo violentísimo. En dos años la tasa nacional vuelve a los niveles de 1991 [19 per 100,000]. Sube un 50% en 2008, y de nuevo 50% en 2009."[2] Further, Escalante Gonzalbo's detailed geographical analysis shows a close overlap between the deployment of military forces against DTOs and the spike in homicide rates, adding additional fuel to the debate.

A partisan complication in the national debate concerns the disputed presidential elections of 2006, in which Felipe Calderón won by less than one percent of the votes cast. Critics suggest that President Calderón deployed the military in a dramatic offensive against organized crime in order to distract public attention from the election controversy and to help gain legitimacy as a decisive commander-in-chief.

If unacceptable levels of violence are the first "horn" of the dilemma, the second is the magnitude of the threat posed by criminal organizations. The larger, "name" DTOs (the so-called Sinaloa and Gulf Cartels, La Familia, and the Zetas, for example) can mobilize the manpower, weaponry, and discipline to violently confront not only state and local police forces but also federal security forces, including the Army. Given the

---

[2] The lower 1991 figure of 16.7 reported by Mainwaring et al. (2010, 32) is probably due to their source, the Pan American Health Organization.

weakness, if not the corruption and collusion of the police with criminal organizations and the time required to reform the police, there is no obvious alternative to the continued use of the armed forces. Basambrío (2010, 35-36) notes the distinctive problem that Mexico faces:

> Para fines de este texto creo que es pertinente separar el caso de México—donde el presidente Calderón ha comprometido a 60,000 efectivos del Ejército en el combate al crimen organizado—del resto de los otros países, no sólo por la historia particular de las Fuerzas Armadas de ese país, sino por la características del fenómeno criminal que allí enfrentan. No estoy sosteniendo que allí también no haya un debate importante sobre si las Fuerzas Armadas deban participar, algo que a mí también me deja severas dudas, sino que estamos ante un fenómeno atípico y diferente que se da en la región con respecto al problema de la seguridad ciudadana.

In a democracy, public opinion will exert some degree of influence on the use of the military in a police role. An element of the debate is the extent to which the government can make the case that DTOs present a national security threat, which justifies (indeed requires) continued use of the military.

Factors that will count include public confidence in actors and institutions, especially the president, the military, the police and justice system, and the public's assessments about respect for human rights and the effectiveness of the military in policing. We do not have specific data about perceptions of DTO´s as a national threat but the following proxies in the 2010 LAPOP survey describe a context in which the average Mexican feels somewhat threatened. Half of the adult general population (47.1

percent) is very or somewhat worried that Mexico could experience a terrorist attack and

52.3 percent are very or somewhat worried that someone within their family can suffer a

violent attack by terrorist. When asked about how much they feel that the current level of

delinquency represent a threat to the future, 68.5 percent respondent a lot and 21.8

percent somewhat. The percentage of Mexicans that responded "a lot" in 2004 was 50.1,

eighteen points less than in 2010. Four at of every ten respondents (44.4 percent) indicate

that their neighborhood is a lot or somewhat affected by gang related activities.

In the following section we first examine change over time in confidence in

several different types of social actors and political institutions in Mexico. We then look

at the Mexico case in comparative context as of 2010.

Part I. Trends of confidence in institutions over time and in regional context

Figure 2 shows the percentage of Mexicans that trust institutions from 1990 to 2010,

using data from two different sources: first, the World Value Survey (WVS), with results

for 1990, 1996 and 2000; and second, the Americas Barometer (LAPOP) series with bi-

annual data starting in 2004. The data help us assess whether trust in institutions in

Mexico increasing or decreasing.

Patterns in these two series, which use similar but not necessarily comparable

questions, will be discussed separately. The WVS uses a four-point scale to capture the

degree of trust in each institution as follows: a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, not

at all. The figure shows the first two responses.[3] LAPOP uses a seven-point continuum

---

[3] This is a conventional method for grouping responses. Moreno (2010) provides a useful discussion of the potential pitfalls of using this method.

and the respondent knows that the higher end of the scale means "a great deal" of trust and the low ends means "no trust at all." The difference of the scales is the main reason that we avoid *between* survey comparison and focus our discussion on the *within* consistency of each series. Another important difference is the wording used in each survey, for example of one survey asked for trust in "armed forces" and the other used the word "army."[4]

Both series rank the same institutions at the top and at the bottom. As documented by surveys for a long time, the Catholic Church and the military are the institutions with the highest perceived trust in Mexico; and the reverse also holds true for the police and the political parties that have historically shared the bottom of the spectrum. Between this floor and ceiling we find the rest of the institutions.

Additionally, both series appear to tell a similar story: trust in institutions in Mexico is decreasing. In the WVS series institutions show a significant increase from 1990 to 1996 but then a significant in 2000. For some institutions the 2000-point is below that of 2004 (press, congress, police and political parties), and for others it is above (church, armed forces and government). The Catholic Church is the exception and shows a slight increase in the WVS series and a more stable trend. The justice system also falls (instead of increasing) from 1990 to 1996 but unfortunately it was not included in the 2000 round of the WVS so we cannot assess its trend.

---

[4] The LAPOP wording is: En esta tarjeta hay una escala con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es el escalón más bajo y significa NADA y el 7es el escalón más alto y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta ver mucha televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. [Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente]. B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?.
The WVS Surrey wording is: For each item listed how much confidence do you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all. The Armed forces.

For the LAPOP series we observe a similar pattern: erratic changes from 2004 to 2006 but steady, small decreases in trust afterwards. This is the case for the justice system, with more pronounced drop in confidence for the police. In contrast, trust in the armed forces, along with trust in government, are exceptions, as both show significant positive changes if we compare 2004 with 2010. The relatively high trust in the press is noteworthy and will play an interesting part in the story we tell in Part II.

Figure 2.

Is institutional trust in Mexico high or low compared with other countries in the hemisphere? Figure 3 below shows the amount of institutional trust in the hemisphere. For each of the eight institutions presented we show the country with the greatest amount of trust as well as the least (in green and orange respectively); the difference between the highest and lowest country represents the range of variation between countries. The range of variation in the justice system, for example, is small compared to the mass media (26

versus 44). Because the scale runs from 0 to 100, the placement of countries also gives us

a general idea whether trust in a particular institution is relatively low, average or high.

In blue we show the amount and rank for trust Mexico by institution.
Comparatively speaking Mexico ranks high in trust for the Army, Congress and Catholic

Church where it appears among the top five countries with higher levels of trust. It ranks

in the middle for trust in Government, Political Parties, Mass Media and Justice System

and low for trust in the Police. In general terms and with the exception of the Police and

Political Parties the level of institutional trust in Mexico is closer to the top of the scale

defined by the country with highest trust in each institution. Another interesting fact is

that in Mexico the Army is the only public/political institutions that has greater levels of

trust than for other non-public institutions such as the Catholic Church and Mass Media.

Figure 3.

Part II: Attitudes about using the Mexican armed forces as police on the streets

Given the Mexican federal government's deployment of the armed forces in specific

regions considered threatened by organized crime, the central question is if public

opinion believes that the military should be involved in policing. Two specific items in

the 2010 LAPOP questionnaire in Mexico speak to this issue: (1) to what point do you

agree or disagree that the Army (*el ejército nacional*) should support the police in public

safety duties?; (2) to what point are you in favor or against the military's (*los militares*)

patrolling city streets to fight crime?[5] The results in Figure 4 clearly show that public

opinion strongly favors an active role of the army in matters of public safety. The

questions use a seven-point scale and we group them into three categories: agree/in favor

for the three responses on the top of the scale, neutral for the intermediate point and

disagree/against for the three responses on the bottom of the scale. While almost nine out

of every ten Mexicans (86.3 percent) agree that the Army should support police in public

safety duties, an equally impressive 81.2 percent indicate that the military should patrol

city streets to fight crime.

Support for the Army in policing is consistent with an additional item that shows

that Mexicans perceived that the army as an effective strategy against crime. The

question asked: How effective do you think it is to use the use of the army to fight

crime?[6] Here opinions are still positive and strong if we again group categories: 41.8

percent indicate that it is very effective, 39.5 percent somewhat effective, 15.1 percent

slightly effective, and only 3.5 percent not effective at all. In sum, as of February 2010

---

[5] MEX3 "Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo en que el ejército nacional apoya a la policía en las labores de seguridad pública?"; MEX6 "Hasta qué punto está a favor o en contra de que los militares patrullen las calles de las ciudades para combatir a la delincuencia?"
[6] MEX7 "Qué tan efectivo considera usted que es el uso de los militares para combatir la delincuencia, muy efectivo, algo efectivo, poco efectivo o nada efectivo?"

when the survey was conducted, most Mexicans supported using the Army as police, a central pillar of president Felipe Calderon's anti-crime strategy.

Another central pillar of the anti-crime strategy is police reform, including merging municipal with state police. No such strong support exist when respondents are asked about merging the municipal and state police; only half are in favor of this measure while the other have is either neutral or against this proposed policy.

As noted in the introduction, a central element of the debate about using the armed forces as police concerns the potential human rights violations that this may entail. Four items were included in the LAPOP 2010 survey about respect for human rights in Mexico; one is general regarding the overall perceived situation and three refer to specific actors. As Figure 4 shows, Mexicans are divided in their perceptions: half agree with the phrase, "Human rights are respected in Mexico," but the other half disagrees or expresses a neutral position. What is interesting to note is that there are significant differences in perception depending on the actors in question, the Army, the police or public officials in general. Consistent with the high levels of perceived trust discussed earlier, the Army scores nearly six points higher than the general perception that human rights are respected and much better than the other two actors. While 55 percent of respondents agree that the Army respects human rights, only one quarter express a similar opinion about police and public officials. The simple correlation between perceived human rights performance of the army and the role it should play supporting police or patrolling the streets is medium/small and statistically significant (.294 and .299 respectively). We explore this relationship in greater detail below.

Figure 4.

A particularly delicate issue involves civilian control of the military, one of the most important achievements of the Mexican Revolution. The importance that the Mexican public attaches to the issues of crime and corruption affects its perception of the potential role of the Army in the broader political system. Respondents were presented with three scenarios and asked for each whether or not a military rise to power via a *golpe de estado* would be justified. Mexicans do not express support for military rule for economic reasons, but they do so for high levels of crime and corruption. While only 22.5 percent indicated that a *golpe de estado* is justifiable due to high unemployment, a whopping 60.5 percent said it would be justified due to a high level of crime and 57 percent due to a high level of corruption. As Figure 5 below shows, the mean support for the army patrolling city streets is consistently higher among those who support military rule under any of the three scenarios, showing a correlation between these two attitudes. Figure 5.

Mean score for support of the army patrolling city streets to fight crime (scale 1 to 7)

5.96	5.66	5.97	5.35	5.98	5.40
Military rule justified due to UNEMPLOYMENT	Military rule NOT justified due to UNEMPLOYMENT	Military rule justified due to HIGH CRIME	Military rule NOT justified due to HIGH CRIME	Military rule justified due to HIGH CORRUPTION	Military rule NOT justified due to HIGH CORRUPTION

Three items in LAPOP 2010 directly address our interest in public attitudes toward Army involvement in policing. The first (MEX3) asks generally about agreement or disagreement that the Army should support the police in public security efforts; the second (MEX6) is more specific, asking about the degree of support or opposition for the military to patrol the streets to fight crime; and the third (MEX7) asks for an evaluation about the effectiveness of the military in fighting crime.[7] We shall refer to these respectively as general support, specific support, and evaluation of effectiveness. The frequencies of these three item were discussed above, and we now use them as dependent variables in the ordered logistic regressions reported in Tables 1, 2, and 3 below.

By way of generalization, ideology and socio-demographic variables are statistically insignificant in all three items. Put another way, the strong support for policing by the Army in both a general and specific role, as well as a positive evaluation, are uniformly distributed across the left-right spectrum and across all socio-demographic

---

[7] See footnote 5 above. We can only speculate about the implications of mixing "the Army" with "the military" in this series of items.

groups tested in the model. That said, it appears that those who lean right are more supportive of the Army's police role and yet more skeptical about its effectiveness. On the other hand, women appear both less supportive and more skeptical, but older people seem to respond in the opposite direction. These are matters of sign, however, and not significance.

Similarly, the variables related to experience (crime victimization or extortion by police) do not tell us much. The exception is a counterintuitive negative relationship between crime victimization and support for a general and specific role for the Army, but at the same time victims tend to be confident about the military's effectiveness. Why a crime victim would be less likely to support a general or specific role for the Army is not obvious, but even less obvious is why—despite not supporting an active role—victims believe the Army is effective in combating crime. Nevertheless, a more interesting story appears in the categories of perceptions, attitudes, and performance evaluation (*desempeño*).

With respect to perceptions, as the belief that the military respect human rights grows stronger, the support for both general and specific roles in policing, as well as favorable evaluation increase. Moreover, as the perception that the police respect human rights decreases, the support for the Army's role and a favorable evaluation decrease. In effect, there appears to be a significant relationship between skepticism about the police and support for the Army with regard to respect for human rights. Further, concern about crime as a long-term problem is positive and significant for support for a general (but not a specific) role and for a positive evaluation. Perception of insecurity at the local level is negatively related at a significant level with respect to evaluation of the Army's

effectiveness, which was an expected result as it can be seen as a performance evaluation.

With regard to attitudes, confidence in the Army has a significant, strong, and positive impact on the support for its policing roles and evaluation of effectiveness. Another important variable is confidence in the mass media: the more one confides in the media, the stronger the support for general and specific roles for the army and a positive perception of effectiveness. Other variables behave more erratically. Confidence in police is positive and significant only with respect to the Army's general role; support for democracy shows up as positive across the board and significant with respect to general and specific roles. Agreement that a high level of crime justifies a *golpe de estado* is positive and significant with respect to the general and specific roles of the Army, but not with perceived effectiveness.

Finally, with regard to performance, a positive assessment of the incumbent president is positive and significant across the board, especially with respect to perception of effectiveness. Other variables are less consistent. Assessment of the performance of the justice system has a negative effect on the support for a general policing role of the Army, which means that the lower one's estimate of the justice system performance, the greater the support for the Army as police. A negative assessment of the economy produces a significant and positive outcome for the Army´s specific role in patrolling the streets.

In sum, ideological and socio-demographic variables tell us that support for the Army's general and specific roles is widespread across the various categories. Other variables, for example, support for a *golpe de estado* in response to high levels of crime or support for democracy, provide clues for understanding support for the Army in

policing. But the muscular variables appear to be: confidence in the army; positive

perception that the Army respects human rights; negative perception that the police

respect human rights; confidence in mass media; and a positive assessment of the

incumbent president's performance. What are some political and policy implications of

our findings?

CUADRO 1. Apoyo a que el ejército colabore con la policía en las labores de seguridad pública, México 2010 (MEX3: "Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo en que el ejército nacional apoye a la policía en las labores de seguridad pública?")

	2010	
Percepciones		
Inseguridad a nivel local	-0.002	
Delincuencia como amenaza para el futuro	0.297	***
En México se respetan los derechos humanos	0.113	*
En México los MILITARES respetan los derechos humanos	0.347	***
En México la POLICÍA respeta los derechos humanos	-0.230	***
Experiencia		
Victimización	-0.004	*
Extorsión por agente de policía	0.001	
Actitudes		
Confianza interpersonal a nivel local	-0.002	
Confianza en la Policía	0.007	*
Confianza en el Ejército	0.011	***
Confianza en el Gobierno Federal	-0.001	
Confianza en el Gobierno Municipal	-0.005	
Confianza en los medios de comunicación	0.006	*
Respeto por las instituciones políticas nacionales	0.004	
Orgullo de vivir bajo el sistema político mexicano	-0.002	
Interés en la política	-0.003	
Satisfacción con la democracia	-0.005	
Apoyo a la democracia	0.007	**
En México hace falta un gobierno de mano dura	0.239	
Justificación de golpe de Estado por mucha delincuencia	0.005	**
Justificación de golpe de Estado por mucha corrupción	0.002	
Desempeño		
Desempeño del sistema de justicia	-0.206	**
Desempeño económico	-0.147	

	2010	
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	0.010	**
Ideología		
Ideología izquierda-derecha	0.031	
Socio-Demográficos		
Edad	0.009	
Edad^2	-0.000	
Escolaridad	0.028	
Urbano/Rural	0.098	
Género	-0.258	
Ingreso	0.004	
Pseudo R^2	**0.092**	

Fuente: *Latin American Public Opinion Project*, México 2010.
Nota: Modelo de regresión logística ordinal.
Niveles de significación estadística: * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p<0.001

CUADRO 2. Apoyo a patrullaje militar en ciudades, México 2010 (MEX6: "Hasta qué punto está a favor o en contra de que los militares patrullen las calles de las ciudades para combatir a la dilencuencia?")

	2010	
Percepciones		
Inseguridad a nivel local	-0.002	
Delincuencia como amenaza para el futuro	0.125	
En México se respetan los derechos humanos	0.096	*
En México los MILITARES respetan los derechos humanos	0.292	***
En México la POLICÍA respeta los derechos humanos	-0.147	**
Experiencia		
Victimización	-0.002	
Extorsión por agente de policía	0.001	
Actitudes		
Confianza interpersonal a nivel local	0.001	
Confianza en la Policía	-0.004	
Confianza en el Ejército	0.011	***
Confianza en el Gobierno Federal	0.001	
Confianza en el Gobierno Municipal	-0.006	*
Confianza en los medios de comunicación	0.009	***
Respeto por las instituciones políticas nacionales	0.005	
Orgullo de vivir bajo el sistema político mexicano	-0.001	
Interés en la política	-0.003	
Satisfacción con la democracia	-0.006	*

	2010	
Apoyo a la democracia	0.005	*
En México hace falta un gobierno de mano dura	0.422	**
Justificación de golpe de Estado por mucha delincuencia	0.003	*
Justificación de golpe de Estado por mucha corrupción	0.002	
Desempeño		
Desempeño del sistema de justicia	-0.032	
Desempeño económico	-0.163	*
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	0.010	**
Ideología		
Ideología izquierda-derecha	0.037	
Socio-Demográficos		
Edad	0.010	
Edad^2	-0.000	
Escolaridad	-0.007	
Urbano/Rural	-0.068	
Género	-0.064	
Ingreso	-0.038	
Pseudo R^2	**0.081**	

Fuente: *Latin American Public Opinion Project*, México 2010.
Nota: Modelo de regresión logística ordinal.
Niveles de significación estadística: * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p<0.001

CUADRO 3. Percepción sobre la efectividad del uso de los militares para combatir la delincuencia, México 2010 (MEX7: Qué tan efectivo considera usted que es el uso de los militares para combatir la delincuencia, muy efectivo, algo efectivo, poco efectivo o nada efectivo?")

	2010	
Percepciones		
Inseguridad a nivel local	-0.005	*
Delincuencia como amenaza para el futuro	0.178	*
En México se respetan los derechos humanos	0.001	
En México los MILITARES respetan los derechos humanos	0.357	***
En México la POLICÍA respeta los derechos humanos	-0.123	*
Experiencia		
Victimización	0.001	
Extorsión por agente de policía	-0.001	
Actitudes		
Confianza interpersonal a nivel local	0.002	
Confianza en la Policía	-0.005	

Confianza en el Ejército	0.013	***
Confianza en el Gobierno Federal	-0.001	
Confianza en el Gobierno Municipal	-0.002	
Confianza en los medios de comunicación	0.008	***
Respeto por las instituciones políticas nacionales	0.002	
Orgullo de vivir bajo el sistema político mexicano	-0.001	
Interés en la política	0.000	
Satisfacción con la democracia	-0.003	
Apoyo a la democracia	0.003	
En México hace falta un gobierno de mano dura	0.066	
Justificación de golpe de Estado por mucha delincuencia	0.002	
Justificación de golpe de Estado por mucha corrupción	0.001	
Desempeño		
Desempeño del sistema de justicia	0.094	
Desempeño económico	-0.165	
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	0.011	***
Ideología		
Ideología izquierda-derecha	-0.035	
Socio-Demográficos		
Edad	0.017	
Edad^2	-0.000	
Escolaridad	-0.031	
Urbano/Rural	-0.165	
Género	-0.199	
Ingreso	0.051	
Pseudo R^2	**0.106**	

Fuente: *Latin American Public Opinion Project*, México 2010.
Nota: Modelo de regresión logística ordinal.
Niveles de significación estadística: * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p<0.001

Part III. Political and Policy Implications of Patterns of Trust and Distrust

With respect to policy, it would appear that President Calderón can draw on a broad and

deep reservoir of support for using the military in domestic policing, at least up to the

present. The main streams that feed the reservoir are concerns about crime, strong

confidence in the military, perceptions that the armed forces are effective in the crime-

fighting role and that they respect human rights, along with generally negative perceptions of the police. The positive assessment of President Calderón's job performance would seem to carry some water as well. Less clear is the role of the mass media. Despite a range of viewpoints in the print media, including quite critical assessments, it may be that the conventional electronic media, especially television, portray the role of the military more positively. The fact that most Mexicans get their political information from television and that two networks virtually dominate the market invite further research on this point. In terms of politics, our findings are consistent with the interpretation that the president's close reliance on the military probably strengthens his standing with the public.

At the same time, we are witnessing a heated national debate about violence, human rights violations, and use of the military in policing. One possibility is that support for the military continues at a high level despite the controversy. Another possibility is that debate and opposition are concentrated regionally, especially where military forces are deployed, and our sample size is too small to detect it. Or the debates may be concentrated in elite groups of opinion-makers and party leaders (mostly in the opposition but also in the President's party), and the mass public ignores or rejects the controversy (recall the especially low standing of political parties in terms of trust). A political implication is that candidates for national office who oppose the use of military as police will need to be cautious in making their case. This is significant because the crime issue will figure importantly in the campaigns leading up to the 2012 presidential election.

With respect to institutional politics, a prominent role for the military in combating crime probably poses more risk than opportunity. In the short term, the military gains from an infusion of resources in terms of pay, benefits, equipment, training, and the like. A positive scenario includes a decline in violence and a general perception that the military performed effectively while protecting human rights. A negative scenario suggests continuing (or rising) violence, scandals of corruption or serious human rights violations, and a perception that the military is ineffective.

Bibliography

Bailey, John and Lucía Dammert. 2007. "Militarización de la seguridad pública en América Latina?" *Foreign Affairs en Espanol*, 7:2, 61-70. (available at: http://www.offnews.info/verArticulo.php?contenidoID=8624; last accessed on January 5, 2011)

Basombrío Iglesias, Carlos. 2010. "Qué hemos hecho? Reflexiones sobre respuestas y políticas públicas frente al incremento de la violencia delincuencial en América Latina" (Para el proyecto Seguridad Ciudadana en las Américas. Programa Latinoamericano del Woodrow Wilson Center, Diciembre).

Corporación Lationbarómetro. 2010. *Informe* (Santiago, Chile) (available at: http://www.infoamerica.org/primera/latinobarometro_2010.pdf)

Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. "Police Abuse in Latin America," *AmericasBarometer Insights* (No. 11).

-----. 2009. "Should Authorities Respect the Law when Fighting Crime?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* (No. 19).

-----. 2010. "Mala conducta policial y democracia en América Latina," *Perspectivas desde el Barómetro de las Américas* (Num. 33).

Escalante Gonzalbo, Fernando. 2011. "Homocidios 2008-2009: La muerte tienen permiso," NEXOS en línea (03/01) (available at: http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulov2print&Article=1943189)

Mainwaring, Scott, Timothy R. Scully, and Jorge Vargas Cullel. 2010. "Measuring Success in Democratic Governance," in Mainwaring and Scott, ed., *Democratic Governance in Latin America* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), pp. 11-51.

Montalvo, Daniel. 2009. "Do You Trust Your Armed Forces?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* (No. 27).

-----. 2011. "What Determines Trust in the Supreme Court in Latin America and the Caribbean?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* (No. 54).

Moreno, Alejandro, "Introducción," in *Confianza en las Instituciones: México en perspectiva comparada*. CESOP Cámara de Diputados/LXI Legislatura, México, 2010, pags. 11-62.

Orces, Diana. 2008. "Corruption Victimization by the Police," *AmericasBarometer Insights* (No. 3).

Withers, George, Lucila Santos and Adam Isacson. 2010. *Preach What You Practice: The Separation of Military and Police Roles in the Americas* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America, November).

Zizumbo-Colunga, Daniel. 2010. "Explaining Support for Vigilante Justice in Mexico," *Perspectivas desde el Barómetro de las Américas* (No. 39).